The paper examines the long run changes in the tax revenue structure in developed countries. We are particularly focused on the testing of a potential shi from taxation on mobile tax bases to less mobile ones, which could be seen as one of the results of rising tax competition. We assume that a decrease in corporate tax revenues is compensated for by higher tax revenues from taxing work and property. Our dataset consists of panel date from 22 OECD countries within the period 1965 to 2012. We tested the potential causalities within the tax mix using Granger causality tests as well as the DOLS and FMOLS panel cointegration techniques in order to reveal possible long run causalities. As far as we know, these techniques have not before been used in this fi eld. Long-run inverse causalities between corporate tax and personal tax revenue as well as corporate tax revenue and indirect taxes are found. Our results could have several important implications for the tax policies in developed countries.
INTRODUCTION
The processes of globalization and economic integration enabled the rising mobility of capital and work. The mobility of work is still limited by several restrictions, but capital can be moved very quickly across the borders. Moreover, global mobility has been enhanced with the gradual increase in the importance of multinationals. Capital moves globally without any signifi cant barriers, but the national tax systems are limited only to certain tax jurisdictions. This opens the door for a relatively simple shi of mobile tax bases from one country to another in order to perform tax optimization or tax avoidance. When the tax burden of capital becomes signifi cantly higher in one country compared to other comparable countries, the outfl ow of the capital from this country can be expected in the near future. Thus, governments are to some extent forced not to raise the tax burden of capital. Furthermore, they may try to lower the corporate tax burden in order to attract investment into the jurisdiction. This situation is referred to as tax competition and can lead to decreases in tax revenue from the taxes on capital in most countries. The missing revenue can be either substituted for by the higher taxation of other less mobile sources, or the lower tax revenue will lead to a reduction in public expenditure or an increase in public debt. Our paper is focused on the consequences of tax competition for the level of tax revenue and its structure in OECD countries. We try to fi nd some empirical support for the existence of a long-run shi from tax revenue from corporate taxes to tax revenue from personal income taxes, property taxes or indirect taxes. Kubátová (2010) considers tax competition as attracting tax bases to tax jurisdictions by reducing the tax burden, either by lowering the tax rates or by narrowing the tax bases. She also emphasises that tax competition is more important in the case of mobile tax bases such as corporate taxes.
Literature Review
The fi rst comprehensive theoretical description and analysis of tax competition was done by Tiebout (1965) . However, Tiebout's study is not focused on tax competition among countries but on tax competition among local governments. Assuming the total mobility of the tax base, Tiebout's analysis implies that the tax base will move to the jurisdiction where the ratio of the public services quantity or quality and the tax burden reaches an optimum. This process could force local governments to adopt measures to meet expectations of tax payers in the region. Široký (2013) distinguishes harmless and harmful tax competition. Harmless tax competition is some kind of fair tax competition, which refl ects only the preferences of citizens. On the other hand harmful tax competition is non-cooperative tax cuts, which are aimed directly at attracting to the tax base. As stated by Talpos and Crasneac (2010) the tax competition literature does not off er a clear view on the implications of tax competition for the economy. On the one hand, tax competition leads to a reduction of taxes levied on mobile factors but on the other hand it increases the effi ciency of public funds. Kubatová (2011) states that tax competition could lead to inappropriate restrictions and undersizing of the state's functions. This potential eff ect of tax competition was mentioned by Oates (1972) . He argued that tax competition leads to ineffi ciency in the public sector, when governments are trying to cut tax rates to attract tax bases regardless of declining tax revenues. This can lead to the so called "race to the bottom", when the tax rates and tax revenues of competing countries gradually decline to a very low or even zero level. The existence of corporate tax competition has been empirically supported for example by Slemrod (2004) or Devereux (2008) . Huňady and Orviská (2014a) using panel cointegration and panel vector error correction models, fi nd relatively strong empirical support for the existence of corporate tax competition between neighbouring EU countries. Moreover, our previous analysis using fi xed-eff ect regression published in Huňady, Orviská (2014b) showed that a higher corporate tax rate in neighbouring countries generally implies a higher tax rate in the country itself. However, the level of corporate tax rate in the country is also determined by other factors such as the openness of the economy, public debt, GDP per capita, public expenditures and the level of corruption in the country. Zodrow and Mieszowski (1986) analyzed the impact of tax competition on tax rates and tax revenues by one of the fi rst complex taxcompetition models. They also found that tax competition could lead to diminishing tax rates on capital income and this will probably cause less tax revenue and a suboptimal level of public goods. Wilson (1999) assumes that this long lasting eff ect of tax competition will lead to the unsustainably of the welfare state as an economic model. Devereux (2008) argues that increasing the level of competition between countries over mobile fi rms, capital and profi ts is consistent with a continuing fall in statutory and eff ective corporate tax rates in the OECD and EU. Sobotková and Solilová (2011) also state, that despite several positives, tax competition of mobile tax bases could cause a reduction in public revenues and the economic growth of the countries. On the other hand, for example, Donath and Slavin (2009) reported that the consequences of tax competition are more complex and do not necessarily lead to a race to the bottom. The geographical location or the concentration of production may lead to diff erent optimal levels of taxation between regions.
Avi-Yonah (2000) argues that increasing pressure from tax competition causes the shi of tax burden form capital to labour, which is less mobile. This has several negative consequences for the equity of taxation. The author also emphasis the fact the decrease in the tax burden on capital is the consequence of growing openness of the economies. Plümper, Troeger and Winner (2009) argue that despite the fact that tax competition causes a shi ing of the tax burden to less mobile factors, the fi scal rules and social equity norms put upward pressure on capital taxation, which returns the taxation of capital back close to its optimum. They also fi nd that governments that are less restricted with some fi scal rules or equity norms have lower tax burdens. Winner (2005) fi nds out that the shi from the tax burden on capital to the tax burden on labour is especially evident in smaller countries. Nerudová and Kapounek (2007) argue that increases in the capital mobility forces EU member states to decrease the tax burden on capital and the lower tax revenue on capital taxation has to be compensated for by an increase in the tax burden on labour. However, based on their results of time series cointegration analysis they fi nd a negative relation between capital mobility and the level of capital tax rate only in a minority of states used in the sample. Moreover, they found the negative relation between tax revenue from taxation of capital and tax revenue from taxation of labour only in 3 out of 22 countries included in the sample. Nerudová (2011) also argued that mobility of capital allows taxpayers to shi the tax base to countries with lower tax burdens. She also stated that tax competition may cause an increase in the tax burden on less mobile factors, and a decrease in the tax burden on factors, with the highest mobility.
Appel (2011) claims that while European policymakers have long acknowledged the shi of taxes away from highly mobile revenue sources to less mobile sources, academics are somewhat less unifi ed in their interpretations of this problem. Szarowská (2013) also emphasises the fact, that higher mobility of capital has generated the perception that the tax burden on capital will be shi ed to labour. The relative mobility of capital also stimulated apprehension about the race-to-the bottom in the taxation of capital. However, the results of empirical analysis done by the author provides mixed evidence for this theoretical assumption. She fi nds that the taxes on capital have decreased by 2.1 p.p., the implicit tax on labour has decreased by 1.9 p.p. and taxes on consumption have increased by 0.4 p.p. between 1995 and 2010 in EU member states. Despite the signifi cant drop in corporate tax revenue in the recent past, it is important to say that, when taking account of longterm data, the importance of corporate taxes does not diminish at all, as stated for example by Vítek (2011) . There are various factors that may cause this situation. Besides the likely increase in the share of the corporate sector and profi ts, there could be a possible shi from personal income taxation to corporate taxation by changing the legal form as reported by Clausing (2006) . The second is especially evident when the corporate tax rate is signifi cantly lower than the tax rate on personal income. The shi from personal to corporate taxation has been empirically supported by the results of Kubátová and Říhová (2009) . They argue that the diff erence between the marginal tax rate on personal income and corporate income is proved to be a statistically signifi cant factor of corporate tax revenue in the OECD countries.
METHODOLOGY AND DATA
The main aim of the paper is to identify the potential long-run causality between the diff erent type of tax revenues and corporate tax revenues in selected OECD countries. We decide to test three hypotheses listed below.
H01: There is an inverse long-run relationship between the corporate tax revenue and personal income tax. H02: There is an inverse long-run relationship between the corporate tax revenue and taxes on goods and services. H03: There is an inverse long-run relationship between the corporate tax revenue and taxes on property.
According to the nature of corporate taxation, we believe that the tax base of this tax is the most mobile of all taxes in a standard tax system. We assume that any decrease in corporate tax revenue is partly or fully compensated with the taxation of personal income, consumption and property, due to lower mobility of tax bases in the case of these taxes. This kind of shi in tax revenue structure is frequently reported in the literature on tax competition, as the potential consequence of tax competition as mentioned in the literature review.
Since we use panel data regressions, all variables include the cross-sectional dimension as well as time dimension. According to our focus on longrun causalities we decide to use the longest time dimension possible, despite the lower number of countries included in the sample (due to data unavailability). The panel data used in the models contains observations on selected variables for 22 OECD between 1965 and 2012. Due to eight missing observations, we get a slightly unbalanced panel with 1048 observations. These 22 countries have been included in the sample: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, UK, and USA.
All variables used in the models are summarized in Tab. I. The infl ation rate as well as GDP per capita have been used as control variables. The eff ect of infl ation on tax revenue could be signifi cant and we want to adjust the tax revenues for possible eff ects of infl ation. We also want to control for the changes in GDP, which could aff ect all indicators used in the model. This can also help us to determine the eff ect of product changes and the economic cycle on diff erent type of tax revenue.
In order to test the assumed causal links between the diff erent types of tax revenues we conducted panel regression analysis. Due to non-stationary variables as well as the need to capture longrun dynamic relationship we decide to use panel cointegrated regression models. More specifi cally, Subsequently, we have tested for the existence of cointegration between the dependent and independent variables using panel cointegration tests developed by Pedroni (1999 Pedroni ( , 2004 and Kao (1999) . They are testing the null hypotheses of no cointegration between panel variables and both are widely used in the empirical literature. The Pedroni (1999 Pedroni ( , 2004 cointegration tests use seven diff erent statistics. Four of them are panel cointegration statistics based on the within approach and three of them are group panel cointegration which are based on the between approach. Kao (1999) tests the null hypothesis that the residuals from the estimation are non-stationary. Furthermore, we also used the panel version of a relatively conventional Johansen cointegration test in order to verify the results. The panel cointegration tests allow us to identify the presence of cointegration but could not estimate any long-run coeffi cients. For this purpose we decide to use panel cointegrated regression models. The long run parameters are estimated by using the dynamic OLS (DOLS) and fully modifi ed OLS (FMOLS) as panel cointegration estimators. The DOLS estimator is proposed by Saikkonen (1991) and Kao and Chiang (2000) and FMOLS estimator is developed by Phillips and Moon (1999) and Pedroni (2001) .
Both FMOLS and DOLS are based on the standard OLS considering the simple fi xed-eff ects panel regression model that can be written as
where Y it is a vector of dependent variable,  is a vector of slopes,  is individual fi xed eff ect and u it are stationary disturbance terms. It is assumed that X it are integrated processes of order one for all i, where: X it = X it−1 +  it , where the vector error process is  it = (μ it ,  it )'. The FMOLS estimator then can be written as follows:
where Δ+ μ serial correlation term that gives covariance matrix of the residuals corrected for autocorrelation and ŷ + it is the transformation of dependent variable y it in order to achieve the endogeneity correction.
The DOLS estimator is obtained from the following equation:
where c ij is the coeffi cient of leads and lags of fi rst diff erenced independent variables. The DOLS estimates of long-run coeffi cients  are super-consistent (Kao, Chiang, 2000) .
Than we can estimate  long run coeffi cient by the following equation:
where As stated, both estimators solve the potential problems with serial-correlation and endogeneity, which are the potential shortcomings of all common OLS estimators. The FMOLS estimator solves these problems by nonparametric corrections, while the DOLS estimator adds leads and lags of diff erenced repressors into the regression as parametric corrections.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The basic descriptive statistics for tax revenue variables used in all regression models are shown in Tab. III. As it can be seen the taxes on goods and services followed by personal income taxes are on average the most important sources of tax revenue. On the other hand, the shares of property taxes and corporate taxes on GDP are signifi cantly smaller in average of selected OECD countries.
As the fi rst step of our analysis we test potential two-way causal relationship between diff erent types of tax revenues using panel Granger causality test. As we can see from the results in the Tab. IV, corporate income tax revenue seems to Granger cause the personal income tax revenue at the 5% level of signifi cance. The opposite direction is valid only at the 10% level of signifi cance and there is no evident Granger causality between any other kind of tax revenues and corporate tax revenue. Thus there seems to be some signifi cant causality in the Granger sense arising from corporate tax to personal income tax.
Subsequently, we perform the panel unit-root tests and panel cointegration tests in order to verify cointegration between selected variables. The results of the unit root test, summarized in the Appendix, suggest that all variables used in the model are non-stationary at levels but stationary at fi rst diff erences, thus they seem to be I(1).
Next, we test the cointegration between the corporate tax revenue and other type of tax revenues using the Pedroni and Kao cointegration tests. Corporate tax revenue has been applied as the dependent variable in all three tests. The vast majority of the tests indicate the existence of a cointegration relationship between each pair of tax revenues (see Tab. V) .
Furthermore, the control variables GDP per capita and infl ation have been add to the cointegration test. The results of the Kao test a er this change still indicate strong support for cointegration between personal income tax and corporate tax (see Tab. VI).
Furthermore, the panel Johansen Fisher cointegration test has been also applied in order to verify the existence of cointegration between selected variables. The results of these tests can be seen in Tab. VII.
A er the unit root and cointegration tests, we proceeded to use the panel cointegrated regression in order to test the long-run causalities among the diff erent types of tax revenue. The corporate tax revenue has been used as the main independent variable in all three models. The GDP per capita and infl ation have been used as control variables. The results of the cointegrating regression using the models with intercept are summarized in Tab. VIII. As we can see, there is evident long-run causality arising from corporate income tax to personal income tax revenue.
The eff ect is negative and it is statistically signifi cant at 1% level of signifi cance in both cointegrating regression models. Thus, we can say that any potential decrease in the corporate income tax revenue is in the long-run partly substituted with an increase in personal income tax revenue. A similar eff ect is partially refl ected also in the case of indirect taxes, but this is signifi cant only at the 10% level of signifi cance. However, there are some signs that the decrease in corporate tax Source: Authors Note: */**/*** means signifi cance at the 10%/5%/1% levels. revenue can be also partially off set with the increase in indirect tax revenue. The positive eff ect of GDP per capita is also evident. The eff ect is positive in all models used, thus the eff ect should not be due to the calculation of tax revenues as percentage of GDP. We can say that higher GDP has a positive long-run eff ect on personal income tax revenue as well as the revenues from taxes on goods and services and property taxes. However, the eff ect seems to be most intensive in the case of personal income tax. The negative eff ect of infl ation appears to be signifi cant for taxes on goods and services and property tax according to our results.
III: Descriptive statistics for the tax revenue variables

Corporate tax/GDP Personal income tax/GDP Taxes on goods and services/GDP Property taxes/GDP
VIII: The results of DOLS and FMOLS cointegrating regressions using the models with intercept
Based on the examination of tax revenues development over the time, we conclude that it could be also suitable to incorporate the linear trend in the equations. The results of regressions with linear trend and intercept are summarized in the Tab. IX. The long-run eff ect of corporate tax revenue on personal income tax revenue is signifi cant only in the case of FMOLS regression. On the other hand, the long-run negative eff ect is even more signifi cant for taxes on goods and services and property taxes. Nevertheless, the eff ect on property tax revenue is positive. This could be perhaps due to, the similar number of companies that pay the corporate as well as property taxes. This could also suggest a link between profi ts and land prices. The increased profi ts of fi rms could be refl ected in the property market. However, these suggestions need more empirical support in possible further research.
We can say that decreasing revenue from corporate taxes could on one hand lead to the longrun increase in taxation of goods and services as well as personal taxes, but decrease in property tax revenue on the other hand.
As mentioned, several authors believe that tax competition could have diff erent negative consequences for tax revenue level as well as their structure. There are theoretical models of tax competition, that present the possibility of the so called race to the bottom problem. This situation could lead to insuffi cient levels of tax revenue and under-provision of public goods. However, the intensity of tax competition and its consequences are highly dependent on the mobility of certain tax bases. In this respect, we believe that the corporate tax should be perhaps the most aff ected tax. A signifi cant share of the literature devoted to tax competition, as Avi-Jonah (2000), Winner (2005) , Nerudová (2011) , claims that there could be some shi from taxation of capital to taxation of less mobile or immobile factors due to the pressure from tax competition. The results of our analysis support this view to a large extent. Based on the results, we cannot reject the null hypothesis 1 and 2. Thus, there is empirical evidence for the inverse long-run relationship between the corporate tax revenue and personal income tax as well as the corporate tax revenue and taxes on goods and services. On the other hand, we can reject the third hypothesis, because we are not able to fi nd any signifi cant inverse long-run relationship between corporate tax revenue and property tax revenue. Our fi ndings suggest that there is substitution between the mentioned types of tax revenues in selected OECD countries in the long-run. To some extent similar research has been done by Nerudová and Kapounek (2007) . They fi nd out that the shi between taxes on capital and labour is evident only in a minority of EU countries. However, the methodology as well as the data used in our paper is diff erent.
Alternatively, there could be several other potential approaches to this problem. Despite many advantages of our approach, it also entails several drawbacks. As the result of applying panel cointegration tests and panel cointegration regression we are not able to test the cointegration and causalities for individual countries in the sample but only for whole panel. This could be solved by using only time series data, but the sample size in each model would be signifi cantly reduced this way. Furthermore, the tax revenue variables Source: Authors Note: */**/*** means signifi cance at the 10%/5%/1% levels.
